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Daring the Courts: Trial and Bargaining
Consequences of Minimum Penalties*
The renaissance of legislation establishing minimum penalties and
other all-or-nothing sanctions' presents a critical question: will these
0I wish to acknowledge the many helpful comments of Bruce Ackerman, Albert
Alschuler, Victoria Cashman, Zolton Ferency, Julius G. Getman, Edward Gramlich, William
J. Haley, Donald Hall, Jan Kmenta, Richard Lempert, Barry Mahoney, Eli Noam, Daniel
Saks, and Ed Zedlewski. I am also grateful to the National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, for research support (Grant Award No.
78-NI-AX-0083); the views expressed in this Note, however, are not those of the National
Institute.
I. The term "renaissance" significantly understates the number of recent reincarnations
of the minimum-penalty concept. See, e.g., S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2101(b)(1)
(1977) (imposing minimum and maximum terms for felony probation); U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Press Release (March 23, 1980) (legislation setting mandatory sentences was adopted
in 27 states and was under consideration in 14 others during preceding three-year period).
See also Radzinowicz & Hood, Judicial Discretion and Sentencing Standards: Victorian At-
tempts to Solve a Perennial Problem, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1288 (1979) (describing English
experience with restricted discretion and harsh penalties).
Policies restricting judicial discretion have alternated over time between legislative favor
and disfavor. For example, in 1786, Tennessee eliminated capital punishment for horse
theft on the first offense, noting that extensive nullification was occurring because "the
punishment in its nature and gradation bear[s] no proportion to the guilt." I E. SCOTT,
LAWS OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE, INCLUDING THOSE OF NORTH CAROLINA Now IN FORCE
IN THIS STATE FROM THE YEAR 1715 TO THE YEAR 1820, INCLUSIVE 366 (Knoxville 1821)
(compilation of state laws). The new statute prescribed a penalty that included a public
whipping of 39 lashes, nailing of the thief's ears to the pillory and then cutting them
off, and branding the thief's cheeks with the letters H and T to mark the person a horse
thief. Id. The success of this more "lenient" penalty is unclear, for the death penalty
was reinstated in 1799, id. at 648, but eliminated again in 1807, id. at 1056. This last
revision allowed greater exercise of discretion than previous statutes in that it provided
for, among other things, imprisonment of six months to two years, and "a number of
lashes, not exceeding thirty-nine." Id.
The term "minimum penalty" is used in this Note to refer to any prescribed minimum
sanction, including fines and imprisonment. Other forms of minimum penalty are pos-
sible. For example, a union officer found guilty of violating provisions of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act may be barred from running for union office
for a specified time period. 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1976). That period would be the man-
dated minimum penalty.
All-or-nothing sanctions are created, in effect, by the adoption of mandatory minimum-
penalty policies, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 6104(a), (b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (penalty option under
Age Discrimination Act of 1975 permitting only total cutoff of federal funds), but they
also exist independently of such policies, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)
(deportation); SuP. CT. R. 8 (disbarment). In addition, the stigma associated with criminal
conviction may be considered a form of all-or-nothing penalty. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 36 (1968). The identifying characteristic of these penalties is
the inability to divide the penalty so that a less severe level of the same form of penalty
can be assigned. Cf. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 810, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 862 (1975) (contributory negligence doctrine is "all-or-nothing" approach).
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policies work, and if not, why not?2 Adopted in pursuance of a com-
mitment to more stringent enforcement of the laws, these legislative
choices of the level and form of sanction 3 also restrict the discretion
of various decisionmakers 4 in the legal process. The difficulty, or para-
dox, of such policies is that their success depends critically on how
the newly restricted discretion is exercised by those same decision-
makers.5 Judicial decisionmakers sometimes respond by "nullifying"
2. Whether these policies "work" is highly sensitive to the definition of success em-
ployed. This Note evaluates the success of the policies principally in terms of four con-
siderations: (1) How well does the policy succeed on its own terms; that is, does the
imposition of minimum or all-or-nothing penalties change the outcome of cases in the
desired fashion? (2) How well does the policy contribute to the achievement of the policy
goals more broadly defined, such as deterrence of a proscribed activity? (3) What is the
incidence or pattern of eventual effect across groups and individuals? (4) How does the
introduction of the policy change the process, as well as the outcome, of decisionmaking?
These questions are traditional ones used in budget evaluation. See, e.g., R. MUsGRAVE:
& P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 179-84 (1973); Carlson, The
Status and Next Steps for Planning, Programing and Budgeting, in PUBLIC EXPENDI-
TURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS 367, 373-74 (R. Havemann & J. Margolis eds. 1970). But cf.
Wildavsky, Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY
ANALYSIS 461 (R. Havemann & J. Margolis eds. 1970) (criticizing program budgeting ap-
proach as administratively infeasible).
3. The concern with enforcement is not limited to the enforcement of criminal laws.
See, e.g., Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy
Case for Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329, 344, 347, 352 (1974) (discussing "defects"
of treble damage private remedy and recommending replacement by mandatory fine and
injunctive relief available to private parties).
4. See K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 9-12 (1971) (noting "variety of discretionary
justice").
Policy choices that restrict judicial discretion need not be made by the legislature; they
may also be made through rulemaking power legislatively delegated to the executive or
judicial branches. At least in the arena of federal criminal law, however, the determination
of policy must be predominantly legislative rather than judicial. United States v. Hudson
& Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). That such a requirement is itself a re-
striction on judicial discretion is not coincidental. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 254-55 (1973) (giving examples of movements for codification in order
to control judicial discretion).
5. The issue of decisionmaking under conditions of restricted outcomes is a general
problem in the law. Within antitrust law, for example, the question arises in the contexts
of forced full-line purchasing, tying and reciprocity arrangements, and other relationships
characterized by restrictions on purchase or sale. See, e.g., Adams & Yellen, Commodity
Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. ECON. 475 (1976) (discussing restrictions
imposed by commodity bundling); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Prob-
lem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957) (discussing restrictions imposed by tying arrangements);
Burstein, The Economics of Tie-in Sales, 42 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 68 (1960) (discussing
restrictions imposed by tie-in sales); Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on
Block-Booking, 1963 SuP. CT. REV. 152 (discussing block-booking as device for discrim-
ination among groups of customers); cf. W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIc THEORY AND OPERATIONS
ANALYSIS 549-69 (4th ed. 1977) (adopting activity analysis and integer programming
approach).
The issue also arises in tort law. For example, the existence of a contributory negligence
rule restricts the decisions of a judge or jury that might otherwise apportion damages
according to relative fault of the parties. The decisionmaker may nullify by failing to find
contributory negligence when it is present, by allocating damages more or less in ac-
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the law: they refuse to reach the legally correct determination of lia-
bility or guilt,6 thus frustrating policy intent.7 Further, because of
the nullification possibility, pretrial negotiations, in which the pros-
pective trial outcome serves as a benchmark, may be resolved differ-
ently with the restrictions than without them.8
This Note investigates the consequences of the restrictions on ju-
dicial discretion effected by the introduction of minimum or all-or-
nothing penalties.0 A model is constructed depicting decisionmaking
cordance with comparative-negligence principles, or by changing the law through inter-
pretation or judicial review. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d
1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (adopting comparative negligence rule after repeated failure
of legislature to enact one); Rubsamen, Medical Malpractice, SCIENTIFIC Am., Aug. 1976,
at 18-23 (examples of nullification through awarding of damages in medical malpractice
cases); cf. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 H.RV. L. REV. 1, 24-25, 28-35, 38, 39 & n.122 (1957) (discussing role of ju-
dicial decisions in shaping, nullifying, or standing apart from development of statutes and
common law); G. Calabresi, The Common Law Function in the Age of Statutes 30-93
(1980) (unpublished manuscript, Yale Law School) (on file with Yale Law Journal) (dis-
cussing judicial interpretation of law as vehicle for change in law or nullification).
Nullification may also result from decisions by nonjudicial actors. See, e.g., Kentucky
v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860) (upholding refusal of governor of Ohio to ex-
tradite person convicted of assisting slave to escape, by denying mandamus writ requested
by Kentucky).
6. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 68 (1966) (finding jury nullification
-as measured by jury verdict different from decision thought correct by judge-in 28%
and greater leniency in 24% of cases studied); Riedel, Discrimination in the Imposition
of the Death Penalty: A Comparison of the Characteristics of Offenders Sentenced Pre-
Furman and Post-Furman, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 261, 265 (1976) (in Pennsylvania, sentences com-
muted more frequently when state had mandatory death penalty, and white offenders'
sentences commuted more frequently than those of nonwhites); Vidmar, Effects of De-
cision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simulated Jurors, 22 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PsYCH. 211, 216-17 (1972) (extent of nullification by experimental sub-
jects found to vary with set of alternative verdicts).
7. Nullification in a particular case, rather than imposition of a prescribed sanction,
is an instance of policy frustration. Whether frequent and widespread nullification frus-
trates the overall policy is a more complicated question, turning both on the specific
goals of the policy and on the effects of case-by-case nullification on other factors con-
tributing to policy success. If, for example, the policy goal is an increase in average
sentence length, then a fall in the likelihood of sanction due to frequent nullification
could more than offset any increase in average penalty. See pp. 627-29 & notes 87-90 infra.
8. For discussion of the relationship between the trial and the negotiated outcomes
in legal disputes, see D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNO-
CENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966), Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECoN.
61 (1971), and J. Lachman, An Economic Model of Plea Bargaining in the Criminal Court
System (1975) (Ph.D. dissertation in Michigan State University Library, available from
University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan).
9. There has been relatively little theoretical or empirical writing on the effects of
restrictions of judicial discretion on outcomes obtained by pretrial settlement. See note 6
supra. Surprisingly, there is also a paucity of work in the industrial relations literature
concerning how bargained outcomes, and negotiated versus conflict patterns of resolution,
are affected by restrictions on the set of acceptable outcomes. There is in that literature,
however, a concept of "prominent points of settlement," which are likely to be discussed
as possible settlement outcomes. In a collective bargaining dispute, one example of a
prominent point of settlement is last year's wage plus a cost-of-living adjustment. See
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by a prosecutor or enforcement agency; the model is then used to ex-
plore the consequences of restricting discretion for individual cases
and for the agency's portfolio of cases.' 0 The Note analyzes the effects
on trial and bargained outcomes of various levels of evidence and le-
gally irrelevant information, of alternative levels of agency enforce-
ment resources, and of the severity of the minimum or all-or-nothing
penalty. After considering the conditions under which policy intent
is effectively implemented, the Note concludes that the success of such
legislation is far from certain. Policies restricting judicial discretion
may backfire, resulting in lower levels of sanction actually being as-
signed and less deterrence of the activity proscribed. The policies
most likely to succeed are those that take the prospective nullification
response into account in the initial determination of the form and
severity of sanction.
I. Judicial Nullification in the Face of Restricted Outcomes
The success of legislation creating minimum or all-or-nothing pen-
alties is endangered by the prospect of judge or jury nullification at
trial-the refusal or diminished readiness to reach the legally correct
determination of liability or guilt.1 Nullification by judicial deci-
sionmakers12 that is precipitated by restrictions on outcome follows
a tradition extending from as far back as medieval England' 3 through
R. WALTON & R. McKERsIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 41-45, 51-52,
105-06 (1965) (prominent points are more likely than others to be considered as possible
settlements, and it is good bargaining strategy to make desired settlement points appear as
prominent ones to other party).
10. The text depicts decisionmaking from the perspective of an enforcement agency
or prosecutor. The problem as viewed by a defendant is analogous, with the defense's
objective being stated in terms of obtaining a desirable case outcome and a high level of
consumption, or whatever characterization is chosen for the other goods and activities
entering into the preference function.
11. See M. KADISH & S. KADIsH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 47, 55-56 (1973); Scheflin, Jury
Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REy. 168, 168, 173, 181-85 (1972).
12. Defining nullification is problematic in itself, for to say that a decisionmaker has
nullified the law presupposes that what is required for fulfillment of the law is known
with sufficient precision to exclude the decision taken. If this definitional requirement is
rigidly imposed, every reversal on appeal might be construed to represent an appellate
determination that the trial judge has nullified; indeed, appellate review has been used
for the purposes of correcting and disciplining trial judges and restricting their discretion.
See, e.g., United States v. Lynd, 349 F.2d 785, 787-90 (5th Cir. 1965) (appellate court di-
rects trial court in civil rights voting case to issue appellate court's injunctive order).
But cf. Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burdens of Proof in the Criminal
Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1393-95 (1979) (discussing case concerning constitutionality of
kidnapping statute, and concluding that trial court decision was correct, but appellate
court's result was "bizarre").
13. See Sykes v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 528, 554-55 (Lord Denning)
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twentieth-century America.' 4 Put simply, a major problem with mini-
mum and all-or-nothing penalties is that they may not be applied at
all.' Although such nullification need not be considered a failure of
judicial function, 16 it may nevertheless signal a failure to fulfill leg-
islative intent.'7
If the new policy is intended to change the level of penalty, but
is not directed either at changing the set of actions to which liability
attaches or at decreasing the likelihood of sanction, then frequent
(as early as 1484, when defendants were charged with capital offense of treason, judges
sometimes gave instruction on misprision as well); ef. Bushell's Case, 22 Charles II
[Vaughan's Reports 135] 6 St. Tr. 999, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ex. 1670) (court's imprison-
ment of juror for refusal to convict defendant found to be impermissible).
14. Judge and jury nullification has been noticed especially in times of social up-
heaval in the United States, such as the period of the fugitive slave laws in the mid-
nineteenth century and the era of the Vietnam War. See, e.g., R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED
191, 211-14 (1975) (discussing controversies surrounding jury discretion and widespread
acquittals in fugitive slave cases); Kunstler, Jury Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10
VA. J. INT'L L. 71 (1969) (discussing jury nullification in Vietnam-era dissent cases).
15. See V. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 430-34 (London 1852) (convictions in-
frequent under regime of harsh penalties).
16. The desirability and functions of jury nullification have been the subject of con-
siderable controversy. Nullification may be viewed from several different perspectives.
It may be seen as the abuse of discretion and public trust; as an expression of public
preferences and, as such, a part of the regenerative processes of law; as the fulfillment ofjurors' commitment to fairness; as either the responsible or the irresponsible exercise of
judicial discretion, depending on the reasons for nullifying and on the fairness of the
resulting pattern of gainers and losers among defendants; or as the constructive use of
inconsistency, satisfying simultaneous public desires for a statement of moral principles
in the abstract and for individualized justice. See W. FORSYTH, supra note 15, at 431-32
("Juries would not condemn men to the gallows for an offense [forgery of bank-notes]
of which the punishment was out of all proportion to the crime .... "; such nullification
led to "'amending many bad laws which the judges would have administered with pro-
fessional bigotry.' ") (quoting Lord John Russell); M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 11,
at .15-66, 139-40 (nullification by judicial decisionmakers and use of prosecutorial discre-
tion is "legitimated interposition" for achievement of social ends); Schulhofer, Harm
and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497, 1554-57 (1974) (discussing sources of decisionmaker dissatisfaction
giving rise to nullification, and possibility of disparate impact as function of defendant
characteristics such as race).
17. See, e.g., Richardson & Heilweil, Sentencing Patterns Under the 1973 New York
State Drug Laws, in STAFF WORKING PAPERS OF THE DRUG LAW EVALUATION PROJECT 245,
259 (Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation ed. 1978) (despite marked in-
crease in percentage of Class A drug convictions resulting in prison sentences, actual
number of convictions for which prison sentences were imposed fell from 2,039 in 1972
to 1,164 in 1975); cf. Sajovic & Goldsmith, The Effects of the 1973 Drug Laws on Heroin
Use in New York City, in STAFF WORKING PAPERS OF THE DRUG LAw EVALUATION PROJECT
1, 8 (Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation ed. 1978) (despite introduction
of stiff minimum penalties for drug use, narcotics use in New York City, which had been
declining prior to new laws, became stable). But cf. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 253
(uncertainty about consistency in applying laws, resulting from "[t]he degeneracy (or
overvigor) of judge, jury, state, or national authority," led to periodic lynching and
vigilante outbursts as popular response to perceived judicial nullification).
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nullification undermines the overall policy.' s When discretion over
the level of sanction is foreclosed, 19 the liability or guilt decision be-
18. In addition to the problems of policy failure in the senses described above, see
notes 2 & 16 supra, there may be far-reaching though less easily observed ramifications.
See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 1, at 262-68, 286-89 (laws frequently nullified in courts
or in earlier enforcement processes create environment in which criminal sanction is
diluted, increasing likelihood that other laws will be disobeyed); Alschuler, Sentencing
Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Pre-
sumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 551 (1978) (fixed or presumptive sentences
"concentrat[e]" discretion in such a way that benefits are unfairly distributed).
Anticipated trial and settlement outcomes indicate to prospective litigants the institu-
tional consequences of their behavior, and thus affect behavior in cases that do not come
to the attention of a court. By this form of long-distance decisionmaking, the message
from patterns of trial and settlement outcomes may clearly indicate how a dispute would
be resolved in the legal process and thus save the potential litigants the trouble and
expense of going to the court to find out. For example, if cases with similar facts in-
volving alleged discriminatory discharge of employees for union activity or organizing
efforts always yield similar results, one might expect that, in the future, similar cases
would be informally resolved by the disputants and that the National Labor Relations
Board would receive fewer complaints than the number of disputes it effectively settles. A
second message to potential litigants, however, may be that the costs associated with
obtaining a trial or pretrial settlement are substantial; if so, prospective litigants whose
dispute involves low anticipated benefit may choose not to undertake such litigation.
To the extent that the first message is clear, the courts and administrative agencies
may be credited with doing a good job of "making law," assuming that the clear de-
cision is a desirable one. The second kind of message is more problematic. Because de-
cisions not to enter the legal process are made in an atomized fashion, courts and policy-
makers are unaware of the frequency and reasons for this behavior, and thus may
misunderstand not only the "discouraged litigant" problem but also the operation of the
more visible processes of dispute resolution that the decision of the discouraged litigant
reflects. Cf. A. SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING 1-30, 152-76 (1974) (describing information, in
addition to that of traditional economic variables, relevant to labor market decision.
making).
In addition, the fulfillment of public purposes may depend largely on private actions
through litigation, particularly in areas where private rights of action are substitutes for
public enforcement. See, e.g., Calabresi, The Problem of Malpractice-Trying to Round
Out the Circle, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACrICE 233, 233-38 (S. Rottenberg
ed. 1978) (discussing incentives arising from tort law, from regulatory or criminal law,
and from contract law for avoidance of costs of medical accidents); Shavell, Theoretical
Issues in Medical Malpractice, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 35, 50-55 (S.
Rottenberg ed. 1978) (comparing alternative approaches to liability for medical accidents
in terms of their effects on quality of medical care). As a result, disputes not worth
litigating because of the high costs of the legal process may be resolved poorly, with a
consequent social loss. Finally, the resulting distribution of gainers and losers in the
legal process may change in politically unacceptable ways as a function of the costs as-
sociated with legal dispute resolution. See, e.g., Note, Costs and the Plea Bargaining
Process: Reducing the Price of Justice to the Nonindigent Defendant, 89 YALE L.J. 333,
351-52 (1979) (nonindigent defendant, who must actually bear costs of trial even if ac-
quitted, is subject to special pressures to plead guilty).
19. The Vidmar experiments on jury decisions under varying choice constellations and
the Kalven and Zeisel findings point out more explicitly the danger of using the lia-
bility or guilt decision to express sanction preferences. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, supra
note 6, at 68 (jury outcomes sometimes more lenient than judge decisions even when both
would convict); Vidmar, supra note 6, at 216 (experimental juries acquitted more frequent.
ly when their discretion was restricted).
Nullification occurs, when it otherwise would not, because of the presence of the re.
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comes the major vehicle for nullification. 20 More specifically, if the
decision on liability is in effect a yes or no decision regarding the
required penalty, the decisionmaker is faced with assigning the man-
dated penalty or assigning no penalty at all.2 1
striction on outcome. However, the occurrence of nullification will be associated with
differences among cases and individual parties rather than with the presence of the
penalty provisions. For example, the decisionmaker will explain that the penalty was
considered inappropriate or unfair because of factors such as weakness of evidence, lack
of harmful consequences, or characteristics of or personal hardship to the defendant.
Kalven and Zeisel found that evidence factors were said to be the basis for disagreement
in 78% of the cases in which the jury would have been more lenient than the judge,
with this figure rising to 84% for hung juries; for cases in which the jury would have
been more harsh, convicting when the judge would not, evidence factors were cited 93%
of the time. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 111; ef. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCE-
MENT OF MORALS 21 (1959) ("I do not mean that they often deliberately disregard the law.
But if they think it is too stringent, they sometimes take a very merciful view of the facts.")
With respect to the importance of harmful consequences, see G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 472-83 (1978) (discussing harmful consequences as giving rise to pattern
of criminal liability), and Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 1554-57 (lack of harmful conse-
quences may increase likelihood of nullification by judicial decisionmakers); for the ef-
fects of defendant characteristics, see H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsFL, supra note 6, at 105 (various
characteristics of defendant are associated with more frequent nullification by juries),
and Schulhofer, supra note 16, at 1527-30, 1559-63 (discussing effects of defendant char-
acteristics on guilt determination).
20. Juries and judges have found other vehicles for expressing dissatisfaction with
restrictions placed on their decisionmaking. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Franklin, 172 Pa.
Super. Ct. 152, 152, 157-61, 92 A.2d 272, 273, 275-77 (1952) (despite acquittal, defendant or-
dered held on bail for two years after trial, in keeping with Pennsylvania tradition dating
from at least 1799); Braynes case, discussed in Bushell's Case, 22 Charles II [Vaughan's Re-
ports 135, 153] 6 St. Tr. 999, 124 Eng. 1006, 1015 (Ex. 1670) (jury attempted "to delude
the Court, by agreeing upon two verdicts, and concealing the latter, if the Court would
be satisfied with the former"); Newman, To Rid the U.S. Courts of the Slovik Syndrome,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1979, § A, at 26, col. 4 (having "misplaced confidence" that subse-
quent decisionmakers will mitigate sanctions ordered, judges sometimes feel liberated
from having to make decision they would be satisfied with if actually carried out). For
a model of juror decisionmaking under the assumption that jurors have single-peaked
preferences, see B. Grofman, Mathematical Models of Juror and Jury Decisionmaking: The
State of the Art 15-24 (1977) (unpublished manuscript, University of California, Irvine)
(on file with Yale Law Journal). See generally Davis, Bray, & Holt, The Empirical Study
of Decision Processes in Juries, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 326 (.
Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977).
21. In Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), the Supreme Court struck down an
Alabama statute that allowed juries to choose only between a death penalty conviction
and acquittal, without a choice of any lesser included noncapital offense, because the
restricted choice might result in juries convicting or acquitting for impermissible reasons.
By contrast, in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), the Court upheld a Texas statute
providing for mandatory life imprisonment upon a third felony conviction, as applied
to a defendant convicted for obtaining S120 under false pretenses; it defined the reach
of the holding by noting "the unique nature of the death penalty for purposes of Eighth
Amendment analysis." Id. at 272.
To the extent that nullification does occur, those left behind after the judicial "filter"
is applied can be characterized as the individuals "chosen" to receive punishment. See
C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 21 (1974);
cf. Riedel, supra note 6, at 275-83 (statistical profile of death row inmates showing changes
in demographic and evidentiary characteristics of cases after introduction of mandatory
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Prescribing a binding minimum penalty for situations in which such
a restriction previously did not exist effectively introduces indivisi-
bility in the units of outcome. This situation is analogous to that
faced by individuals making economic decisions about the purchase
of automobiles, houses, or packs of soft drinks, in which the option
of a fractional quantity is not available.22 When the presence of a
minimum penalty renders unattainable the outcome otherwise de-
sired, the judicial decisionmaker must decide whether the next best
solution is to accept the minimum or to nullify.2 3 If decisionmakers
death penalties); Wolfgang & Riedel, Race, judicial Discretion and the Death Penalty,
407 ANNALS 119 (1973) (same).
Viewed from this perspective, the findings of the Chicago jury project are consistent with
the contention that differences in outcome will be attributed to differences among in-
dividuals or evidence, rather than to the level of the penalty itself. Although some of
the judge-jury disagreement was attributable to concern with the harshness of the penalty,
most was attributable to dissatisfaction with "the evidence" or to "values" differences
between judge and jury. Kalven and Zeisel found that "facts" by themselves were a cause
of disagreement in 34% of the cases in which judge and jury disagreed; that "values
alone," such as defendant characteristics, were a cause in 21% of the cases; and that values
and facts together were a cause in the remaining 45% of the cases. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
supra note 6, at 116, 165-67. Their results indicate that various factors may be heavily
intermingled with one another.
[T]he jury does not often consciously and explicitly yield to sentiment in the teeth of
the law. Rather it yields to sentiment in the apparent process of resolving doubts as
to evidence. The jury, therefore, is able to conduct its revolt from the law within the
etiquette of resolving issues of fact.
Id. at 165.
In many circumstances, the jury would prefer to make no choice at all; they would
prefer to leave the choice in the hands of the judge. [1969] 8 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION
HANDBOOK (Jury Verdict Research) 5335, 5335. This interpretation could also apply to
the 5.5% hung juries found in the Kalven and Zeisel study. See H. KALVEN & H.
ZEisEL, supra note 6, at 56.
22. In the field of marketing research, virtually no information is available about the
process of making purchasing and packaging decisions. First, what studies there may be
have for the most part been made by businesses that have a strong incentive to keep the
results secret. Second, studies that have asked consumers how they reached their deci-
sions and compared the subjective results with purchasing patterns suggest some incon-
sistency in the subjective and "objective" rankings of factors by importance. See, e.g.,
Permut, Cue Utilization Patterns in Student-Faculty Evaluation, 83 J. PsYcH. 41, 46-47
(1973). Finally, there appears to be no general theory of how purchasers determine the
purchase-no purchase threshold as a function of packaging of the product, nor any theory
of the optimal package size as a function of anticipated purchasing decisions. But cf.
J. HIRSHLEIFER, INVESTMENT, INTEREST, AND CAPITAL 66-69, 108 (1970) (economic analysis
of capital goods purchases in discrete units).
Related to the question of decisionmaking under conditions of indivisibility is the
theory of the second best, which is more accurately' a theory of what the second best is
not. When the optimal outcome in a situation cannot be attained, the next best outcome
may not be the outcome remaining that is closest to the original optimum. See J. HEN-
DERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMic THEORY 286-288 (2d ed. 1971) (discussion of second
best theory in welfare economics context).
23. Juries may have the responsibility of imposing sanctions, but more typically they
are required only to make a determination of liability or guilt. If they are not told the
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respond by assigning the new penalty in cases in which they would
otherwise assign a lesser one, the intent of the policy is fulfilled.
However, if decisionmakers respond by failing to find liability al-
together when they otherwise would,24 the policy is frustrated. The
extent of judicial nullification may, of course, be sensitive to the
severity of the all-or-nothing or minimum penalty.25
consequences of their liability determination, they nevertheless make the decision based
on whatever information about the consequences they do have, even though it may be
sketchy or incorrect. See, e.g., [1969] 8 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK, supra
note 21, at 5335 (42% of jurors assumed defendant was covered by insurance in some or
all cases, and said their decision would not have been different had they been sure);
Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J.
158, 165-69 (1958) (jurors use information going to issue of damages in determining
liability).
24. See, e.g., S. POISSON, RECHERCHES SUR LA PROBABILITE DES JUGEMENTS 390-91 (Paris
1837) (when, in 1832, French juries were given additional verdict option of finding guilt
under extenuating circumstances, conviction rate rose by 10%) (percentage compiled from
author's numbers). Vidmar arrived at similar conclusions for experimental juries. He hy-
pothesized that under conditions of restricted decision alternatives, the higher the least
severe guilt alternative, the greater the chances of obtaining a not-guilty verdict. Vidmar,
supra note 6, at 215. When the jurors were allowed to choose only between first-degree
murder and acquittal, they acquitted 54% of the time, but when two intermediate choices
were added, the acquittals accounted for only 8% of the dispositions. Id.; see Larntz,
Reanalysis of Vidmar's Data on the Effects of Decision Alternatives on Verdicts of Simu-
lated Jurors, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 123, 123-25 (1974); B. Grofman, Theory and
Experiment on Juries: Did the Supreme Court Get It Right? (June 1977) (Social Science
Working Paper No. 124, School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine).
25. Two mechanisms exist for monitoring the use of discretion. If juror or judge dis-
satisfaction with the penalty is sufficiently widespread, it may be reflected in statistical
distributions of trial outcomes and be recognized as resulting from the penalty require-
ment. See, e.g., P. GREENWOOD, S. WILDHORN, E. POGio, M. STRUmivASSER, & P. DELEON,
PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFENDANTS IN Los ANGELES CouNrY 48-59 (1973) (tables
depicting disposition of cases by ethnic group of defendants and by other characteristics)
[hereinafter cited as Los ANGELES FELONY PROSECUTIONS]; Richardson & Heilweil, supra
note 17, at 291-302 (tables and discussion of association of prior record, age, quantity of
heroin or type of drug with likelihood of prison sentence for defendants who pleaded
guilty to drug charges). Appellate review also provides a safeguard against unacceptable
decisions on a case-by-case basis. See Note, Courting Reversal: The Supervisory Role of
State Supreme Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 1191 (1978).
In the pretrial context, neither of those devices necessarily signals dissatisfaction with
the penalties or unacceptable patterns in their application. Problems that arise from
differences in the initial strength of the parties are less easily discernible in cases re-
solved without trials. Alschuler contends that the potential unfairness and abuse of dis-
cretion by prosecutors in plea bargaining are usually beyond the reach of outsiders seeking
to monitor the administration of justice. Alschuler, supra note 18, at 551. Employing
what one might call a "hydraulic" theory of judicial process discretion, in which re-
strictions on the discretion exercised by one decisionmaker precipitate compensating
adjustments by another, he argues that the introduction of fixed or presumptive sen-
tencing concentrates discretion in "an inappropriate agency . . . in which the benefits
of this discretion are made available only to defendants who sacrifice their constitutional
rights." Id. at 551; see TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 11-34 (1976) (study and recommendation concerning pre-
sumptive sentencing).
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II. Pretrial Settlements With and Without Restrictions
on Judicial Discretion
Negotiated settlements account for up to ninety-five percent of the
convictions obtained in criminal cases handled in urban courts26 and
for the great majority of civil cases brought in state and federal courts.27
Despite the seeming rarity of dispute resolution by trial, the pattern
of trial outcomes generally and the anticipated trial outcome in a
given case are critical factors in determining the level of bargained
outcomes. The anticipated trial outcome serves as a benchmark to
the parties when they assess the desirability of possible bargains and
decide whether to accept a negotiated settlement or to reject the final
settlement offer in favor of going to trial.28 Thus, changes in the
26. See D. MCINTYRE, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE METROPOLIS 132 (1967) ("[Trhe mag-
nitude of guilty pleas [as a percentage of felony convictions], on a national scale, has been
estimated to be as high as 95 percent and as low as 69 percent.") (footnotes omitted);
Lachman & McLauchlin, Models of Plea Bargaining, in MODELING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 145, 147 (S. Nagel ed. 1977) (guilty plea yielded more than 16 times as many
convictions as did trials in Detroit in 1972, and estimates of bargained dispositions in
American cities range from 75% to 95%).
27. See H. Ross, SETrL D OUT OF COURT 4-6 (1970) (settlements without trial are ubiq-
uitous, accounting, for example, for 98% of bodily injury negligence claims in New
York).
28. As with the desirability of and purposes served by nullification at trial, there are
conflicting perspectives on the desirability of and purposes served by pretrial negotiations.
One argument in favor of pretrial settlements is that of expediency: settlement of disputes
without recourse to adversary proceedings yields an outcome that is desirable to both
parties-that is, the outcome is Pareto optimal-and does so at substantially lower cost than
that of a full trial. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (suggesting
that judicial process depends critically on existence of plea bargaining); D. NEWMNAN. supra
note 8, at 4 ("Compared to the typically long, costly, and complex trial, the guilty plea
is a model of efficiency .... ") This perspective often implicitly assumes that, in the absence
of "caseload pressure," few disputes would be resolved by pretrial bargaining and that
such a pattern of resolution would be preferable to the present one. But cf. M. HEUMANN,
PLEA BARGAINING 27-33 (1977) (finding plea bargaining prevalent and equally important
in cities of varying sizes and varying levels of resources and caseloads). Other writers have
argued that the pattern of widespread settlement of disputes reflects not a response to
caseload pressure, but an institutional style of operation, which is perpetuated by the
socialization of newcomers to the staffs of enforcement agencies. See, e.g., id. at 92-126.
The legal debate over negotiated settlements has tended to focus on the desirability
of pretrial bargaining apart from considerations of cost to the parties or the possible
desire of parties to avoid trial for reasons other than cost saving. One side of the debate
has emphasized the importance of the right to trial and of other rights effectively waived
or compromised by obviating the need for trial through negotiating a settlement. See, e.g.,
Alschuler, supra note 18; see Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors
to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 869-70, 874-78 (1964). The concern with
pretrial bargaining is with its incidence-by race, income, age, seriousness of violation or
harm-and with the conditions of exchange, that is, the rights sacrificed in return for
penalty or charge reductions.
For a behavioral explanation in a general bargaining context, see T. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960), and R. WALTON & R. MCKERSIE, supra note 9. Economic
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anticipated trial outcome, such as the increased possibility of nulli-
fication, result in corresponding changes in negotiated settlements.
These, in turn, will have important consequences for the success of
such policies as minimum or all-or-nothing penalties.
A. Pretrial Settlements Without Restrictions
The traditional explanation of why parties bargain is that they
agree to forego their right to a trial in exchange for a more favorable
outcome as measured by the level of penalty.2 9 This condition, how-
ever, may not and need not be met.30 Even if the pretrial settlement
were to yield the same outcome that would have resulted from trial,
both parties save the costs of going to trial3' as well as the costs asso-
ciated with delay. The consequent savings to each party provide the
"play" that defines the limits of bargaining. A bargainer such as a
prosecutor or enforcement agency is better off32 accepting a pretrial
models of bargaining typically assume that the benchmark effect of anticipated outcomes
has already been determined and focus instead on how the bargainers divide the amount
of the bargained good in the settlement range. See, e.g., F. ZEUTHEN, PROBLEMS OF MONOP-
OLY AND ECONOMIC WARFARE 115-21 (1930) (bargaining range assumed to be given); Bishop,
Game-Theoretic Analyses of Bargaining, 77 Q.J. EcON. 559, 563 (1963) (discussing models
of bargaining under assumption that Pareto optimal set is known).
29. See, e.g., Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice,
46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 780, 783-85 (1956); Note, supra note 28, at 874-78.
30. Cf. W. Rhodes, Plea Bargaining: Who Gains? Who Loses? (1978) (Institute for Law
and Social Research, PROMIS Series No. 14) (statistical study finding that defendants
pleading guilty in District of Columbia obtain sentences on average no lower than those
of persons going to trial). Interestingly, this explanation is not the traditional one in the
labor context. Indeed, the early theory of Sir John Hicks described the benefit of "skilled
negotiation" as that of reaching the same outcome at an earlier time without the costs
of an extended strike. J. HicKs, THE THEORY OF WAGES 143-44 (1st ed. 1932).
31. See United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679, 685 (N.D. Ill. 1960) (estimating
government's costs of instant trial at $11,250 until time of sentencing); Note, supra note
18, at 551-52 (discussing costs of disposition by trial or plea bargaining for nonindigent
defendant); J. Lachman, supra note 8, at 29-31, 60-62 (discussing costs associated with
trial and bargain outcomes).
32. Economic models have adopted alternative characterizations of the bases for en-
forcement agency decisionmaking, including maximizing the expected number of convic-
tions weighted by sentence length, see, e.g., Landes, supra note 8, at 64, making prose-
cution decisions, viewed as investment, so as to reduce future criminal activity, see, e.g.,
Forst & Brosi, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Prosecutor, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
177, 180-84 (1977), and maximizing utility, defined as a function of two variables rep-
resenting sentence outcomes in different cases, without assigned weights, see, e.g., J.
Lachman, supra note 8, at 28-29. The third approach-assuming the enforcement agency's
or prosecutor's goal to be a combination that includes seeking favorable outcomes from
individual cases, as well as disposing of all cases in the docket-is employed here in order
to investigate the contention that pursuit of convictions in cases to which a mandated
minimum penalty applies may meet with success at the expense of lower outcomes for
other cases in the prosecutor's or enforcement agency's portfolio.
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settlement up to the point that the cost savings associated with
avoiding trial exactly offset the difference in desirability between
the trial outcome and the pretrial settlement. This cutoff point is a
bargainer's reservation settlement.33
Although this pretrial settlement outcome may itself be less desir-
able than the trial outcome, the cost savings associated with trial and
with delay until trial allow a prosecutor or enforcement agency 34 to
allocate more resources to the remaining cases in its portfolio. 35 When
this reallocation occurs, the "loss" in the instant case is associated
with a "gain" in outcome for the other cases in the portfolio.
1. The Trial Outcome Benchmark
Before entering into bargaining, a party must determine its bar-
gaining stance: it must decide how much it is willing to concede be-
fore invoking its right to go to trial.36 Determination of this reser-
vation settlement is made by comparing the anticipated trial outcome
with successively less attractive levels of bargained outcome until the
level is reached that yields exactly the same satisfaction as the antici-
pated trial outcome. The area between the cutoff points of the two
parties constitutes the bargaining zone.37
33. The "reservation-price settlement" or "reservation settlement" is that level of bar-
gained outcome at which a party is indifferent between settlement and the prospect of
going to trial. This is analogous to the definition of the reservation wage in labor eco-
nomics, and is variously described by the terms "concession point," or "resistance point,"
or by other terms in the bargaining literature. See, e.g., R. WALTON & R. McKs.RSm, supra
note 9, at 43.
34. An analogous structure describes the determination of the defendant's reservation
price. See note 10 supra. However, depending on how the concept of risk aversion is repre-
sented in the context of undesirable goods such as sentences or fines, the defendant's
reservation settlement function may be discontinuous, a result consistent with defendant
specialization in case outcome or in nontrial goods-for example, consumption goods.
See J. Lachman, supra note 8, at 66-79.
35. See Rhodes, The Economics of Criminal Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 321-28 (1976) (levels of bargained settlements of crim-
inal cases found to be positively related to level of prosecutor resources in cross-sectional
analysis by city).
36. The choice of going to trial is a weapon in pretrial negotiations. See H. Ross,
supra note 27, at 215-16. A dispute that does go to trial may be construed as a failure of
negotiations. Id.
37. The agreement, if one is reached, should reside in this bargaining zone, as de-
picted in Figure A. The agreement reached by the parties will usually be approved by
the judge. See McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d 306, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (refusal to
accept guilty plea should be for "good reason"); Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in
Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76 COLUM. L. Rev. 1059, 1064, 1067-69, 1153-54 (1976) (discussing
frequency with which judges approve parties' agreements and advocating greater judicial
control of plea bargaining process); Note, Judicial Discretion to Reject Negotiated Pleas,
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Thus far, the discussion has assumed that the level of resources of
the agency, the initial strength of the parties relative to one another,
and the resulting agency resource-allocation pattern are all given. Al-
ternative values of any of these items will affect the level of the bar-
gaining cutoff.
Agency Resources. The agency's resource level represents only those
resources freely allocable between two cases. It is measured by the
difference between the agency's total budget and its fixed costs, where
the latter are costs that do not vary with outcome. An increase in
the agency's allocable resources-for example, because of a reduction
in case-maintenance costs due to technological advance-would yield
a different resource level.38 As a result, more resources would be de-
voted to the instant case and others, thus improving the anticipated
trial outcome. This more favorable trial outcome would, other things
being equal, require that a bargain be more favorable to the agency
in order to be as satisfying as the new anticipated trial outcome.
63 GEo. L.J. 241 (1974) (prosecutorial abuse of discretion required in order for judge to
reject bargain). For purposes of the argument in the text, it is assumed that such
refusal by the judge does not occur.





Figure A. Cutoff Points of the Parties, and Bargaining Zone.
38. See J. Lachman, supra note 8, at 29-31, 88-89 (discussing enforcement agency costs
and resource effects); id. at 59-62 (discussing costs to defendant).
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Relative Strength of the Parties. The initial strength of the parties
is a function of specified factors giving rise to the dispute and of the
charactefistics of the parties. These factors and characteristics include
evidence admissible at trial as well as legally irrelevant information."
For example, an admission of wrongdoing is relevant information,
and the race of the defendant is irrelevant information; both affect
the relative strength of the parties.40 The weaker the initial position
of the defendant relative to that of the agency, the better the antic-
ipated trial outcome4' and the more favorable the reservation settle-
ment level must be to the agency in order to make pretrial settlement
as attractive an option as going to trial.42
Agency Resource Allocation. Implicit in the determination of the
anticipated trial outcome and its associated satisfaction level is a
39. The relative strength relation may be written
r = r(e, d,, d ..... dh)
where e denotes admissible evidence and dl, i = {1, 2. h), represents characteristics
of the defendant, such as race, age, sex, employment status, previous relationship with
the agency or other governmental units, and other factors. Alternative states of any of
the contributing factors can be expected to affect the level of r, and consequently the
trial outcome level. For example, if the defending party has admitted to engaging in
the proscribed activity, the value of r is lower and is consequently associated with trial
and bargained outcomes more favorable to the prosecutor.
Although a disadvantage in initial strength may be overcome to some extent by ex-
penditure of resources for case development, the party so disadvantaged will, other things
being equal, always be at some disadvantage. This occurs either because the initial handi-
cap is not mitigated by sufficient expenditure of resources, or because the resources used
to compensate for previous disadvantage could otherwise have been devoted to improving
outcome still further. For handicaps in the form of evidentiary information, this effect
may or may not be acceptable. For legally irrelevant information, it is clearly undesirable.
See E. GREEN, JUDICIAL ATTITUDES IN SENTENCING 29-63 (1961) (discussing effects of legal
and nonlegal factors); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 115-16 (slightly more
than half of judge-jury disagreement found to be explained by evidentiary factors, with
other disagreement attributable to jury "sentiments on the law" or defendant; however,
disagreement on evidence may occur because jury also "give[s] expression to values and
sentiments under the guise of answering questions of fact"); Lempert, Modeling Rele-
vance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1977) (analytical exposition of effects on judicial decision-
making of relevant and irrelevant information).
40. See J. Lachman, supra note 8, at 113-15 (statistical result associating evidence-
related information and defendant characteristics with greater estimated strength of prose-
cutor in felony property cases in Detroit).
41. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 160 (table 52) (showing generally
lower rates of jury acquittal when prosecution's evidence is stronger and when "balance
of contradictions" favors prosecution) ; L. MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR TRIAL? 41-44 (1979)
(discussing factors increasing defendant strength); J. Lachman, supra note 8, at 122-35,
149-52 (statistical results and scatter plots depicting bargain outcome and relative strength
of parties).
42. The prosecutor can influence the development of a strong case by engaging in
"sleuthing" activity, building upon the evidence initially provided by the police. The
concept of relative strength employed in this Note refers to the level of strength prior
to such explicit efforts on the part of the prosecutor. The latter type of action is re-
flected in the allocation of resources on the appropriate constraint.
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decision concerning the allocation of agency resources. With a budget
of a given size and fixed cost commitments known, the remaining re-
sources can be allocated among cases so as to achieve maximum agency
satisfaction with the outcomes in the agency's portfolio of cases. 43 Let
43. This allocation decision is analogous to that of a consumer with a fixed budget







Outcome of Case V
Figure B. Allocation of Agency Resources Between Cases V and X and Corresponding
Trial Outcomes.
r. and M. of the parameters in the resource constraint, one can solve the constrained
maximization problem and thus determine the values of v, x, and U associated with the
optimal trial outcome. The equilibrium conditions are that the resource constraint be
met and that the marginal rate of substitution of v and x be equal to r, that is,
aU(v,x)/av
aU(v,x)/ax = r.
The result will be an outcome of v. for the instant case, and an outcome level of x.
for the remainder of the portfolio.
An increased level of allocable resources would correspond to a northeasterly shift on
the graph of the budget constraint, a more favorable initial strength level would be
represented by a counterclockwise rotation of the constraint, and either of these would
yield a higher outcome level in the instant case as well as, in general, in case X. The
bargaining cutoff, or the reservation settlement, will generally rise with the level of
anticipated trial outcome, and would rise in either of the examples given above. See
note 41 supra (likelihood of jury trial acquittal or of low-sanction plea bargain outcome
declines as strength of prosecution's case increases).
The exception in consumer theory to the relationship derived here for v = f(r) is that
of a Giffen good for which a price rise results in a greater, rather than lesser, quantity
demanded. In order for this effect to occur, the good must account for a relatively large
bhare of the consumer's expenditures, see J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, supra note 22, at
34, and this is unlikely to be true for a single case in the enforcement agency's portfolio.
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the enforcement agency's preferences be represented by the function
U - U(v,x),44 where v denotes the outcome of case V, the instant case,
and x represents a composite of the outcomes of all other cases in the
docket,4 5 case X. If the agency allocates resources in an optimal fashion,
given the level of its allocable resources and its initial level of strength
relative to that of the defendant, the result will be an outcome of vo
for the instant case, and an outcome of x, for the remainder of the
portfolio.
The Trial Opportunity Set. The enforcement agency or prosecutor
thus faces an opportunity set that pairs outcomes attainable at trial
for the particular case V with those attainable for all other cases X,
depending upon how resources are allocated. This resource constraint
is represented by the equation rv + x = M, where r represents the
relative strength or initial position of the parties, 40 and M represents
the resources that the agency can allocate between the two cases.47
2. The Negotiated Outcome
If a case is resolved by pretrial settlement, the agency can avoid
the cost of a full trial and some of the case-maintenance costs otherwise
incurred in the pretrial period. The pretrial settlement resource con-
straint is then r'v + x - M', where M' is the new level of agency dis-
44. It is assumed that U(vx) is continuous and differentiable over the domain, v,. ' 0,
and that the usual assumptions about diminishing marginal utility with respect to v
and x apply.
45. It is assumed that the agency allocates resources among the remaining cases-
that is, case X-in an optimal fashion.
46. The more general form of the budget constraint is rv + Im = M; for simplicity,
k is assumed equal to unity.
47. Outcomes v and x may be measured in various ways, depending on the institu-
tional setting. For example, v could represent a term of incarceration, measured in years,
or it might be an index of several aspects of the outcome, such as the weighted sum
of a fine and a prison sentence.
The resource constraints need not be linear, but linear forms are used here for ease
of exposition. The more general functional forms yield similar results. In the general case,
the opportunity set is a production possibility frontier derived from the production func-
tions for case development stated in terms of the relevant inputs, such as attorney time,
and a budget constraint for the agency, stated in terms of the prices of the inputs to
case development and the level of financial resources over which the agency exercises
allocative control. J. Lachman, supra note 8, at 29-34. With the usual assumptions of
diminishing marginal productivity, the resulting production possibility frontier corre-
sponding to the opportunity set used in this Note has a negative second derivative for
v, x > 0.
In addition, it is assumed that the relationships of the model are deterministic, al-
though other approaches are possible. See, e.g., Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, Stochastic
Models of Choice Behavior, 8 BEHAVIORAL Sci. 41 (1963). For simplicity and tractability,
the model employed in this Note assumes deterministic, rather than stochastic, relation-
ships.
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posable resources, where M'>M,48 and where r' is the relative strength
of the parties under conditions of pretrial settlement. The value of the
v-intercept of the new opportunity set is lower than before, because
the best possible outcome from the agency's vantage point is less fa-
vorable than the best outcome obtainable from trial. Given this op-
portunity set, the agency is able to determine an optimal outcome
pair (v',x') satisfying the new settlement opportunity set. If the cor-
responding utility level exceeds that obtainable from trial, the agen-
cy will be better off accepting a settlement.
If the new utility U' obtainable from settlement does not exceed
that available from trial, however, the agency can still find settlement
attractive if the defense offers a sufficiently large initial concession. 49
In particular, the defense can promise to refrain from using the full
strength of its evidence when the settlement agreement is entered in
court, thus confronting the agency with an artificially different value,
r*, of the strength parameter in the settlement opportunity set. 50 With
sufficient, but customary, restrictions on the relevant functions, 51
there exists exactly one level of strength-concession by the defense
associated with settlement strength level r*, and one level v*, the
minimally acceptable settlement, that would render the agency indif-
ferent between the two modes of resolution.
The prebargaining stance of the agency is then to accept a settle-
ment only if vtv*. In deriving v* and r*, the equilibrium condi-
tions are (1) that the satisfaction or utility level attained by pretrial
settlement be equal to that attained from trial, Uo; (2) that r* be equal
to the marginal rate of substitution at that utility level, U,; that is,
in graphical terms, that the settlement opportunity set be tangent
48. The level of agency allocable resources M' is greater than before because of the
cost saving from avoiding trial. Within this framework, the decision to drop a case may
be viewed as a limiting case of pretrial settlement, in which the outcome is zero.
49. Prosecutors describe such an initial concession as finding out "if we're really
talking about a plea." J. Lachman, supra note 8, at 57 n.34 (from interview with prose-
cutor); cf. A. DouGwLs, INDUSTRIAL PEACEMAKING 278 (1962) (labor mediator cautions
management to make sufficiently large initial concession in order not to insult labor
representatives or damage negotiations beyond repair).
50. Such withholding of the full strength of a party's case is frequent in the handling
of guilty pleas. Each party submits just enough evidence to suggest that the new charge,
or suggested sentence, is appropriate to the case. D. NEWMAN, supra note 8, at 15-20.
Actually, as Newman points out, the condition of appropriateness is not always met. Id.
at 100-01 (citing examples); see, e.g., Remington, Fair and Certain Punishment (Book
Review), 29 VAND. L. REv. 1309, 1315 (1976) (relating example from interview with in-
mate: "'I see you were convicted of unarmed robbery in Detroit. What caliber of gun
did you use?' Without even a smile, the inmate would respond 'A .38 caliber revolver.' ")
51. These restrictions are that the utility function and the trial and settlement op-
portunity sets meet the usual assumptions as described above. See notes 45-47 supra.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 90: 597, 1981
to the indifference curve corresponding to satisfaction level U.; and
(3) that the settlement opportunity set, r' + x = M', be satisfied for
r- r*. 52 The determination of the settlement outcome is illustrated
in Figure 1.
U,




Outcome in Case V V
Figure 1. Equally Attractive Outcomes by Trial and Settlement
Since v* was determined for an initial value of r, we can associate
v* with that value and label v*(r) the reservation settlement function,
which describes the conditions under which the agency choice switches
from trial to pretrial settlement. Permitting r to assume alternative
values and v* to adjust accordingly generates this reservation settle-
ment function, which states the agency's demand for pretrial set-
tlement in terms of the "price" of trial. As the defense's strength
increases relative to that of the agency-that is, as r increases-the penal-
ty that the agency is prepared to accept in settlement diminishes: pre-
trial settlement is a decreasing function of r. 53
52. The equilibrium conditions are:
(1) U(v*,x) = U.,
(2) .( I and
(3) r*v* + x = M',
where r* is the level of strength exerted by the defendant.
53. That is, av*/ar<O. Cf. Forst & Brosi, supra note 32, at 179-84 (alternative func-
tional forms, also continuous, associating probability of conviction with case outcome);
Landes, supra note 8, at 64-66 (same); Rhodes, supra note 35, at 315 (same).
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B. Effects of Introducing Minimum or All-or-Nothing Penalties
Minimum or all-or-nothing penalties may significantly affect the
resolution of cases by trial or negotiation. They influence bargaining
by altering the anticipated trial outcomes, which in turn modify the
agency's preferred settlement outcome.
1. Trial Outcome Effects and Consequences for Settlement
To determine its bargaining position, an agency must first deter-
mine its anticipated trial outcome under the minimum penalty re-
striction. Holding r and M constant, let vm denote the required mini-
mum sentence, and let vt be the lowest level of unrestricted trial
outcome for which the decisionmaker remains willing to find liability
or guilt, given the imposition of a mandated minimum. The relation
of vm and vt is expressed by the equation vt = f(vm), where vt in-
creases with vm. This conviction threshold, vt, need not equal the
required minimum sentence; indeed, the extent to which these two
values differ provides one measure of the degree of fulfillment of
policy objectives. Two limiting cases of this relation are vt = vm and
vt = 0. In the first case, decisionmakers nullify in all cases having an
unrestricted trial outcome lower than the minimum penalty, and the
policy fails.5- In the second case, the legislative objective is fully im-
54. In less technical terms, the problem may be illustrated as follows. Suppose that
two parties, defendants in separate actions, face only slight differences in evidence against
them, but one defendant operates under the handicap of a legally irrelevant attribute.
Without the imposition of a restriction on discretion, the first defendant would antici-
pate a fine of s800 and the second of $700, due to the difference in initial position.
Once a minimum penalty of $1000 is introduced, however, the decisionmaker may obey
the policy in the former defendant's case, finding a $1000 penalty preferable to no
penalty at all, but may nullify in the latter case, feeling that increasing the penalty by
almost 50% is going too far. By such a mechanism, a small piece of relevant evidence
or a legally irrelevant factor, which previously resulted in a discernible but not dramatic
difference in outcome, is associated with greater disparity in outcome for two cases that
are otherwise identical. Cf. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642-43 (1980) ("apparently
mandatory" death penalty "interject[s] irrelevant considerations into the fact finding
process . . . [and] may encourage the jury to convict for an impermissible reason . . .
[or] to acquit for an equally impermissible reason").
The bargaining effects are as follows: suppose that the negotiated outcomes in the
absence of the penalty restriction would be $400 and $350, respectively. After introduc-
tion of the minimum penalty, however, the change in trial outcomes-from $800 to $1000
for the first case and $700 to $0 in the second-will tend to push the pretrial settlement
outcomes farther apart than before. The first defendant will be seeking to avoid a $1000
fine rather than one of $800 and will be willing to pay more to do so; the second will
be seeking to avoid an anticipated fine of $0 and will be willing to pay less than when
the alternative was a trial outcome of a $700 fine. See p. 622 infra (Figure 4).
The effect of introducing the minimum penalty restriction for trial outcomes and for
bargained outcomes benchmarked to them, is, therefore, to truncate what is otherwise
a "smooth" relationship between overall initial strength level and the outcome of the
dispute. See pp. 623-25 infra.
The Yale Law Journal
plemented: the mandatory sanction is assigned in all cases that under
the unrestricted regime would result in any penalty at all.
In the agency's assessment 55 of the outcome of trial, the effects of
introducing a restriction on penalty may be divided into four distinct
situations: (1) the anticipated trial outcome in the unrestricted case
exceeds the new penalty minimum, and the trial outcome is unaf-
fected; (2) the anticipated trial outcome in the unrestricted case also
exceeds the new required minimum, but the new minimum, even
though not binding, nevertheless influences outcome; (3) the new
minimum exceeds the anticipated trial outcome in the unrestricted
case and raises the trial outcome to the new penalty level; and (4)
the new minimum exceeds the anticipated trial outcome in the un-
restricted case and results in nullification. These outcomes are il-
lustrated in Figure 2 (on following page).56
55. Analysis of the effects on the defendant's decisions of introducing a minimum
penalty yields analogous results. There exists a value r, of prosecutor strength relative to
that of the defendant, below which the nullification prospect results in a reservation price
more favorable to the defendant than would hold in the absence of the minimum penalty.
A theory of bargained outcome that involves a proportional split of the bargainable dif-
ference yields a result for bargained outcomes that follows the pattern described in the
text for the stance of the prosecutor. See J. Lachman, supra note 8, at 84-98, 135-36.
56. Depending on the form of the preference function, a fifth case may arise in which
the optimal outcome in the unrestricted case lies in the region below the nullification
threshold, but is nevertheless surpassed in desirability by the outcome combination for v
and x associated with the application of the minimum penalty. This situation is illus-
trated in Figure C below. In this case, the introduction of the penalty requirement re-
sults in a decreased level of outcome in case X; that is, a reallocation of agency resources









v,. Outcome in Case V
Figure C. Fifth Case, in Which Agency Allocation Shifts Toward Attainment of
Minimum Penalty in Case V, with Consequent Allocation Away from Case X.
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Outcome in Case V
Figure 2. Four Cases of Anticipated Trial Outcome: (1) trial outcome
unaffected by penalty requirement; (2) minimum penalty
is not binding, but influences outcome; (3) policy raises
outcome to new minimum; and (4) nullification.
The first situation, in which trial outcome remains the same as in
the unrestricted case, results in the same bargained outcome as before.
The second situation, although perhaps not common in practice, is
more complicated. Assuming for the moment that vt<vm, then even if
the unrestricted outcome is greater than the minimum penalty, vm, it
is possible that the minimum penalty will influence the outcome,
and do so in a surprising manner. In this situation, the minimum
penalty provides a comfortable fallback position for the agency in
cases that otherwise afford an outcome above, but only slightly above,
the new minimum.
The agency can obtain the same trial outcome in this second case
-namely, the minimum penalty-even if the allocation of its resources
results in a lower expenditure on case V than would occur in the
absence of the new policy; this is true provided that the expenditure
level does not fall below the level corresponding to that of outcome
vt. Because of this ability, the agency is able to reach a higher level
of satisfaction by spending just enough to attain trial outcome vt and
by devoting the resources thus saved to the other cases in its portfolio.
In this situation, the policy is successful in that it helps the agency,
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even though it causes trial outcome to go down rather than up.57
Despite this fall in trial outcome, the agency will require a higher
reservation settlement level, which must provide satisfaction equal to
the new higher level now attainable from trial.58
In the third case, each anticipated trial outcome between vt and
vm is mapped to v. This set of trial outcomes may be called the
policy implementation zone. Within this zone, the utility-maximizing
agency allocates as few resources to outcome improvement as possible,
so long as the outcome is at least at level vt, thus avoiding nullifica-
tion.5 9 In this situation, the agency obtains a more favorable outcome
in case V than before and is still able to reallocate some of the re-
sources saved to improving the outcome in other cases. As a conse-
quence, the agency obtains a higher level of satisfaction from the pros-
pective trial outcome and is correspondingly more demanding in terms
of pretrial settlement.
The fourth, and final, situation involves the possibility of nullifica-
tion, an outcome that puts the agency at a disadvantage. The re-
strictions on judicial discretion result in zero outcome for those cases
with anticipated trial outcomes less than vt; that is, for cases that fall
in the nullification zone. For the limiting case of full nullification,
that is, for vt = vm, the higher the level set for the minimum penalty,
the lower the level of agency satisfaction,6" and the lower the level
57. Outcome v. can be obtained at a resource commitment of only that required for
v.; although the outcome of case V falls, the agency is able to reach a higher level of
satisfaction overall, and is therefore aided by the policy. In contrast, in the nullification
case, a lower trial outcome signifies policy failure; therefore, this second case is a dis-
tinctly pro-agency anomaly.
58. This circumstance, in which the lower trial outcome is associated with the higher
reservation settlement level, is the exception to the general benchmarking effect of trial
and settlement outcomes. The benchmarking effect is violated here because the reservation
settlement level follows the change in utility associated with trial outcome, and the trial
outcome in this special case does not reflect the overall well-being of the agency's out-
comes on the whole portfolio of cases. Indeed, whenever the presence of the minimum
penalty allows a higher level of utility to be reached, the reservation settlement is made
higher by the minimum penalty.
59. As discussed above, see note 56 supra, there is also a special case in which antic-
ipated trial outcome is below vt, but the enforcement agency would choose to allocate
resources toward improvement of outcome in case V in order to benefit from the "boot-
strap" effect of the minimum penalty, as described in the text. In other words, the
agency would obtain maximum benefit for this special case and for the one described
in the text by trying to achieve exactly outcome v,, whether by adjusting expenditures
upward or downward in order to do so. The agency would allocate to case V just enough
resources to avoid going into the zone of the fourth situation, where nullification is
anticipated.
60. From the analysis of the preceding section and the assumptions distinguishing
this case, it follows that there exists a point (v,.,x,) in the original trial opportunity set
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of the reservation settlement. This result occurs because as the mini-
mum penalty increases, it forces greater and greater reallocations of
agency resources toward the improvement of outcome in case V, to
the detriment of outcome in case X. Since the original allocation
yielding outcome (voxo) would be optimal in the absence of restric-
tions on discretion, the effect of imposing ever higher levels of mini-
mum penalty is to drive the best attainable allocation ever farther
from the optimum. The successively worsening position of the agency
with respect to trial outcome is reflected in a worsening position
in pretrial negotiations.
that is associated with the optimal allocation of agency resources in the event of trial,
and a corresponding point (v*,x*) denoting an equally satisfactory outcome if case V
is resolved by pretrial settlement. The v* value is the reservation price corresponding to
trial outcome vo. The minimum penalty restriction on outcomes from trial is associated
with cutoff point v,, where v,>vo in this event. Since (vo,xo) represents an optimum po-
sition, with vt=v,, the point (v,,F(vt)) must necessarily be associated with a lesser
level of satisfaction, U*. Permitting adjustment through the settlement opportunity set,
as before, one can determine the values of v', x', and r' such that the satisfaction gained
Outcome in
Case X
Settlement Outcome Without Restrictions
Settlement Outcome with Restrictions
)
x*)
Trial Outcome Without Restrictions




Outcome in Case V
Figure D. Case Outcomes With and Without Restrictions on Judicial Decision.
from settlement at some point (v,,G(v,)) on the settlement opportunity set is exactly
equal to that from outcome (vt,F(vt)) obtained at trial. The relationships of the trial
outcomes with and without judicial restrictions to their settlement counterparts are il-
lustrated in Figure D.
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2. Effects on Outcome of Differences in Relative Strength of the
Parties, Agency Resources, and Minimum Penalty Levels
In the absence of restrictions on judicial discretion, higher levels
of initial strength of the defendant relative to the enforcement agency
are associated with decreased trial and settlement outcomes.61 This
relationship is represented by the continuous functions denoted v(r)
and v*(r), respectively. When a minimum penalty requirement is in-
troduced, however, the trial opportunity set becomes the discon-
tinuous relation depicted in Figure 2. Determining the effect that
alternative levels of initial strength have on trial and bargained
outcomes is more laborious than in the unrestricted case.
Let F(r1), shown in Figure 3 by the solid line, represent the trial
opportunity set associated with relative strength level ri of the de-










v, V, Outcome in Case V v
Figure 3. Opportunity Sets F(rl) and F(r2 ), r2>rt.
by dotted lines, is determined as follows. First, the nonbinding por-
tion of F(r2), segment D'E', is smaller than that of F(r1 ), segment DE,
with the result that a larger part of the opportunity set falls into
the nullification and policy implementation zones. Second, for v in
the implementation zone, that is, for vt-5v!vm, the set of unrestricted
61. The exception, as before, is the unlikely case of a Giffen good. See note 43 supra.
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outcomes of segment B'D' is mapped to segment C'D', the latter being
greater in length than its counterpart segment CD on F(rl). 2 Third,
the mapping to zero of the unrestricted outcomes for which 0'v<vt
yields the nullification segment AH'.63 Finally, since segment C'D'
is greater than segment CD, the zone of the comfortable fallback
effect increases with the strength of the defendant.
Comparing F(r2) with F(rl), it is clear that the stronger the defen-
dant's position relative to that of the enforcement agency, the more
restrictive the penalty's effect. This results in greater relative im-
portance of both the nullification and policy implementation zones.6 4
The resulting trial outcome, considered as a function of r, is discon-
tinuous. For low values of r-that is, when the defense is weak-the
outcome coincides with that of the unrestricted case; for an interval
of r-values, the outcome equals v; and finally, for sufficiently large
values of r, the outcome equals zero. The location of these discon-
tinuities depends on the specific form of the preference function.
For r low enough that nullification does not occur-that is, for
r<r(vt), as depicted in Figure 4-the agency is always at least as well
off with the restriction as without it, and its reservation settlement
will reflect that fact: the reservation settlement will be at least as
great as in the unrestricted case for those outcomes. 65 For values of
r at which trial nullification is anticipated, however, the reservation
settlement is lower than in the unrestricted case.
62. The proof that C'D'>CD is an exercise in the geometry of similar and right
triangles.
63. As has been true throughout the discussion of this section, the text result assumes
that v. = v,; that is, it assumes that the thresholds for nullification and for agency
resource allocation are coincident. If this is not the case-that is, if v,#vt-then the text
analysis holds, but with the term v, replaced by min {v.,vt).
64. This result is consistent with the contention that the decisionmaker's definition
of "beyond a reasonable doubt" becomes more restrictive as the associated penalty rises.
Although such a redefinition of the doubt threshold for conviction could also be modeled
in terms of an increased threshold for nullification, the qualitative result would be
the same as that described in the text. Further exploration of the interaction between
nullification thresholds of judicial decisionmaking and relative strength of the parties is
outside the scope of this Note. See J. Lachman, Juror Decisionmaking Under Conditions
of Restricted Choice (1980) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
65. The proof of this is an exercise in the geometry of similar and right triangles.
The settlement function v*(r) will have a similar shape, although the number of points
of discontinuity may be greater. There are additional permutations possible for the
boundary points of the agency's trial nullification and implementation borderline with
those emerging from the application of the reservation settlement algorithm to the mini-
mum penalty problem. These additional permutations would add more points of dis-
continuity to the relationships depicted in Figure 5, but would not otherwise significantly
alter the results.
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Outcome
in Case V vo(r)=vl(r)
()3)
, [ V" (4)
r(vm) r(v) r
Relative Strength of Defense vis-a-vis Agency
Figure 4. Trial Outcome as a Function of Relative Strength: without
restriction v0 (r); and with restriction v'(r) on trial outcomes.
Numbers in parentheses correspond to those in Figure 2.
Increased levels of agency resources, M, have effects similar to those
of a stronger agency initial position, as illustrated in Figure 5. A
higher level of resources, as represented by Fl(r), results in a larger
range of outcomes for which the restriction is not binding. 6
The changes associated with an alternative level of the minimum
penalty are also similar. A higher penalty shifts the level of Vm to
the right, and increases the level of vt, where vt - f(Vm). As a result,
the nonbinding range is decreased in length, and both the nullification
and the policy implementation zones are more prominent. 7 As the
mandated penalty rises, the best obtainable trial outcome moves far-
ther away from the unrestricted optimum, and the reservation settle-
ment falls accordingly. 68
66. See pp. 615-16 supra.
67. A higher penalty is represented by a shift in the line v = v. to the right. Again
comparing similar triangles and parallel lines, one obtains the result stated in the text.
68. This analysis does not predict the effect of agency effort on the remainder of the
caseload without additional information or assumptions concerning the agency's pref-
erence function and constraints. In particular, under one set of circumstances, the in-
troduction of the judicial restrictions will result in a shift of agency effort toward im-
proving outcome among other cases in the portfolio; under other conditions, the
remaining cases will suffer as well.
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Figure 5. Effect of Increase in Resources from Level F(r) to F1 (r)
III. Policy Consequences of Imposing Minimum Penalties
The introduction of an all-or-nothing or minimum penalty has
several consequences that are of special policy interest. These con-
sequences point to the need to consider not only minimum or all-
or-nothing penalties, but also other available policy tools. Such an
approach should attempt to minimize the divergence between penal-
ties that satisfy the policy intent and those that satisfy the decision-
maker's sense of fairness.
A. The Effects of Minimum Penalties
Consequences of minimum penalties include the effects on indi-
vidual case outcomes and the implications of these changed outcomes
for agency resource allocation and for the certainty and severity of
sanction.
I. Effects on Individual Outcomes
When discretion is unrestricted, small increases in the initial strength
level are associated with small changes in the anticipated trial outcome
and in the reservation settlement level. When discretion is restricted
by the imposition of a minimum penalty, however, the effects of dif-
ferences in initial strength may change. 69 The adoption of a minimum
69. See pp. 620-22 & notes 61-66 supra.
623
The Yale Law Journal
penalty necessarily results in the exclusion from the set of possible
trial outcomes of all levels of sanction between zero and the minimum
penalty. The consequences for the defendant of losing the case ob-
viously become more severe than in the absence of the penalty re-
striction. This change also produces important bargaining effects,
which are similar to the effects on trial outcome.
With the imposition of a minimum penalty requirement, defen-
dants with initial strength levels sufficiently great to yield a zero out-
come-that is, acquittal-are clearly treated alike and, as a result, small
differences in initial strength among members of this group do not
become manifested in differences in outcome. Similarly, among those
defendants assigned the minimum penalty, variation in initial strength
levels among group members is not associated with variation in sanc-
tions assigned.7 0 This lack of change in penalty despite differing levels
of initial strength may be desirable, for example, if the differences in
initial strength are attributable solely to irrelevant information, 71 or
if the intent of policymakers is to effect uniform treatment of indi-
viduals whose cases exhibit only small differences in levels of initial
strength. For two cases falling on the same side of the threshold for
conviction, then, the introduction of the minimum penalty annihilates
the effects of differences in initial strength of the parties.7 2
When two cases fall on opposite sides of the threshold, however,
the difference between them in initial strength is associated with a
difference in outcome equal to the difference between the mandated
penalty and zero.73 This difference is greater than would have oc-
curred in the absence of the minimum penalty. 74 Consequently, if the
70. See T. SELLIN & N,. WVOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY 45-50, 236-349
(1964) (interpretation of penalty structure as reflecting seriousness of offenses); A. VON
HiRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 77-83, 132-40 (1976) (normative discussion of structure of penalties);
Becker, An Economic Approach to Crime and Punishment, 76 J. POLrTICAL ECON. 169, 177
(1968) (characterizing probability and severity of penalty as constituting a "price" of
criminal behavior).
71. For- the effect on bargained outcomes of varying levels of information, see L.
FouRAK ER & S. SEmEL, BARGAINING BEHAVIOR 125-66 (1963) (bargaining experiments), and
Harnett & Hamner, The Value of Information in Bargaining, 11 W. ECON. J. 81 (1973)
(economic analysis).
72. As illustrated in Figure 4, two defendants having small differences in initial
position and assigned penalties in the unrestricted case, reflecting the initial strength
difference, may both be assigned the minimum penalty or both be assigned an outcome
of zero.
73. This would occur, for example, if one defendant's case falls below and the other's
above the nullification threshold v,, as depicted in Figures 2 and 5. This jump corre-
sponds to the borderline between the policy implementation and nullification zones, as
defined above, see pp. 615-16 supra, and depicted in Figures 2 and 4. For discussion of
indicators of success, see note 2 supra.
74. If the policy is fully implemented-that is, if there is no nullification-and if the
penalty is applied in all cases yielding convictions in the absence of restrictions, then
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effect of a small difference in initial strength is to place one defendant
on the acquittal side and another on the conviction side of the thresh-
old, the difference in outcome associated with the small difference
in initial strength will be magnified.75 Since the initial strength of
the parties was defined to be a function of various informational items,
alternative levels of any one of these items, whether an item of ad-
missible evidence or of irrelevant information,7" can determine which
outcome-acquittal or the minimum penalty-results.
2. Effects on Agency Resource Allocation
For the agency, the elimination of intermediate penalties and the
resulting prospect of nullification make inadvisable some otherwise
reasonable allocations of resources. In particular, an allocation that
would yield an outcome substantially below that of the new mini-
mum, 77 and consequently trigger nullification at trial and the bargain
effects noted earlier, would waste resources that an enforcement agen-
cy could better conserve for other cases. This is true for all allocations
yielding a trial outcome below the nullification threshold.78
Thus, in the presence of such a policy, the enforcement agency is
confronted with a new choice in cases in which a finding of liability
would occur in the absence of a restriction on discretion. To make
the best use of resources, it must either allocate resources heavily to
the improvement of the instant case or reallocate its resources to-
ward cases holding more promise for findings of liability through
trial or settlement.7 9
the threshold for conviction occurs at the lowest point at which any penalty would be
applied at all. If the policy is not fully implemented, the extent of nullification deter-
mines the level of would-be outcome, in the unrestricted case, at which the threshold
is located. This example illustrates the problem dealt with in more technical detail above.
See pp. 615-16 supra.
75. This would occur, for example, if the absence of a single minor piece of evi-
dence results in substantial numbers of acquittals and low settlements when intermediate
levels of trial outcomes or bargained settlements would otherwise obtain. See Vidmar,
supra note 6, at 215.
76. Such a problem would arise, for example, if jurors perceive the mandated penalty
to be too harsh for whites, but not for blacks, as, may be the case with mandatory death
penalties. See note 54 supra; note 89 infra.
77. Determining the point at which this threshold is reached requires experimental
research in which the level of the minimum penalty is changed by small intervals in
successive experiments; the two-, three-, and four-verdict options of the Vidmar experi-
ments, Vidmar, supra note 6, and the Larntz reanalysis of the Vidmar data, Larntz, supra
note 24, do not provide enough options to approximate the effects of such small changes.
78. See pp. 616-19 supra.
79. We expect the agency to allocate additional resources among cases in such a way
that the marginal benefit of an additional unit of resources is equalized for all cases in
the portfolio; this is the usual requirement for economic efficiency, but with the addi-
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This polarized pattern of adjustment in expenditure can generate
mixed efficiency results. For those cases in which the policy is im-
plemented and those in which the minimum penalty provides a com-
fortable fallback position, the new allocation of agency resources yields
a higher level of agency satisfaction than would occur in the absence
of the minimum penalty.80 When nullification is anticipated, however,
the resulting allocation is one that would not have been chosen in the
absence of restrictions and is consequently associated with an effi-
ciency loss,8 ' as viewed from the agency's perspective.8 2
Moreover, the level of resources of a party and the costs associated
with delay and duration of trial are closely intertwined. Obviously,
the lower the costs associated with waiting for trial or carrying out
the trial, the greater the resources left available for activities that im-
prove trial and bargained outcomes .8  When greater delay and its
tional complications of the indivisibility associated with the minimum penalty restriction.
This concerted reallocation of effort at a very early stage is exactly the sort of early
screening recently begun in several urban jurisdictions with respect to criminal cases,
and is undertaken in regulatory agencies as well. See, e.g., Los ANGELES FELONY PROSE-
CUTIONS, supra note 25, at ix, 3 (discussing police and prosecution screening practices);
R. Nsimmm, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMIS OF PROSECUTION 14 (1974)
(discussing "screening" out of system as possible official response in cases "calling for
extreme leniency"); 99% of Felony Arrests in the City Fail to Bring Terms in State Prison,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1981, § I, at 1, 28, cols. 4-5 (estimate that majority of felony arrests
were dismissed or reclassified as misdemeanors in boroughs where cases are screened by
special staff units) [hereinafter cited as 99% of Felony Arrests].
Whether a case becomes a target of such agency effort depends in part on the initial
strengths of the parties. Consequently, it is another potential magnifier of the effects of
small differences in evidence or in legally irrelevant information. See pp. 610, 620-22
supra; notes 41 & 54 supra.
80. There are three cases in which the introduction of the penalty affords the agency
a higher level of satisfaction by increasing the feasible set. The obvious case is the one
of policy fulfillment; in addition, the second case noted in Figure 2, in which the new
penalty provides a comfortable fallback position, and the fifth case, see note 56 supra,
resulting in agency allocation toward case V, yield the same outcome.
81. In other words, the exclusion of a choice-in this case, of all those choices below
the minimum penalty-results in the outcome being, at best, as good as the optimal one
without the exclusion. This is the general reasoning in the construction of several price
index measures. See J. HIESHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 140-45 (1976).
82. The unhappy alternative to this stringent early screening is to run the risk that
resources would be devoted to cases that almost, but not quite, surpass the conviction
threshold. Some losses of the latter kind may occur anyway because those who gather
the evidence contributing to the prosecutor's initial strength, such as police officers, may
not know in advance the strategy to be pursued by the enforcement agency in light of
its allocable resources. See, e.g., Los ANGELES FELONY PROSECUTIONS, supra note 25, at ix,
62 (for over half of defendants arrested by police, District Attorney refused to file
felony charges; of felony complaints filed, roughly half were rejected for felony
prosecution).
83. See, e.g., Japha & Bauman, The Effects of the 1973 Drug Laws on the New York
State Courts, in STAFF WORKING PAPERS OF THE DRUG LAW EVALUATION PROJECT 128, 140
(Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation ed. 1978) (after introduction of
minimum penalties for various drug offenses, "even cases which did not ultimately result
in a trial took significantly more court time"); 99% of Felony Arrests, supra note 79,
at 1, 28, col. 4 (Queens District Attorney cites backlog of "crisis proportions" despite
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consequent delay-associated diminution in evidence 4 occur in the
presence of a minimum penalty restriction, s5 one may expect more
frequent or more extreme nullification at trial and bargained out-
comes different from those that the same evidence would have brought
in the unrestricted case. In addition, relatively greater importance may
be associated with evidence and with nonevidentiary factors contrib-
uting to the initial position of the parties,80 thus magnifying dif-
ferences in individual outcomes and leading to efficiency losses asso-
ciated with lower levels of resources.
3. Effects on Severity and Certainty of Sanction
In addition to the effects noted above, the overall pattern of trial
and bargained outcomes87 determines levels of certainty and severity"8
felony prosecution of only one-fourth of felony arrests made in previous year). Since in-
creases in delay or trial outcome are borne by both parties to a dispute, the net effect
of such cost increases on the parties is not immediately obvious. In terms of the level
of resources allocable to outcome-improvement activities, both parties are worse off be-
cause of delay, and their comparative disadvantages will depend on many factors tied
to the individual case. For example, delay will be more costly for defendants incarcerated
before trial than for those who are not. See p. 609 & note 38 supra. The initial strength
of the parties will be of relatively greater importance in determining case outcome when
delay is great, and resources that might otherwise be devoted to improving trial outcome
are instead used for case maintenance and other costs of delay. See J. Lachman, supra
note 8, at 37-43 (economic representation of costs of trial and of pretrial delay).
Added to the "pure" resources effect is the "burden" effect applicable as a function
of various possible burdens of proof. For example, because the prosecution in a crim-
inal case must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a diminished level of resources
due to increased trial delay may make the difference, in terms of the associated level
of outcome improvement activity that is possible, between reaching and not reaching
the required proof threshold. In addition, because evidence available to a party tends
to decline over time-as witnesses die, move away, or forget, and as real evidence is or
is not maintained-delay will take a relatively higher toll from a party facing the heavier
or more difficult burden of proof. See Japha & Bauman, supra, at 170-71, 177-78; J.
Lachman, supra note 8, at 113-15, 119 n.22, 120 nn.23-25; Special Narcotics Unit of the City
of New York, Progress Report, Centralized and Decentralized Parts at V-21 to V-23 (1976).
The relative effect generally favors the defendant. See J. Lachman, supra note 8, at 113-14
(statistical results indicating that prosecutor strength declines as a function of delay until
trial). The effect of the enforcement agency's burden of proof may be negated, however,
in the event of presumptions favoring the agency. See generally Jeffries & Stephan, supra
note 12; Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in
Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977).
• 84. The evidence losses to each side will vary, depending on the kind of evidence
primarily relied upon. For example, a party heavily dependent on witness testimony and
memory will be more vulnerable to delay effects than a party that relies on documents,
which can presumably be preserved intact. See F. CANNAVALE, WITNESS COOPERATION pt. 1,
at 12-17, pt. 2, at 2-3 (1976).
85. See Japha & Bauman, supra note 83, at 139 (new mandatory penalty drug law
resulted in growing backlog of cases in New York City).
86. See pp. 624-25 supra; notes 19-21 supra.
87. This is true also for cases dropped or not pursued by the enforcement agency
because of the changed pattern of priorities among cases consequent to the adoption of
the required penalty. See pp. 625.26 supra.
88. Such a change is consistent with social science findings of a negative relationship
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of sanction different from those prevailing in the absence of the policy.
In particular, if there is substantial nullification, the increase in se-
verity of the prescribed sanction will be accompanied by a fall in the
likelihood of the sanction actually being assigned, so that the in-
crease in severity is obtained at the expense of a fall in certainty. 0
If, as current research indicates, certainty is more important than
severity in deterring the proscribed activity,00 then the new policy
between the level of sanction and the likelihood of conviction, and the characterization
of likelihood and severity of sanction as substitutes for one another in deterring pro-
scribed activity. See, e.g., Gibbs, Crime, Punishment and Deterrence, 48 Soc. Sc. Q. 515
(1968). But see Antunes & Hunt, The Impact of Certainty and Severity of Punishment
on Levels of Crime in American States: An Extended Analysis, 64 J. CRum. L. & CPIMINOLOGY
486, 492-93 (1973) (if certainty of sanction is low, increased severity will have little de-
terrent effect); Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Em-
pirical Investigation, 81 J. POLITICAL ECON. 521, 544-47, 552 (1973) (same result obtained
by multiple regression analysis).
It should be noted, however, that certainty is more important than severity within the
relevant range of the certainty-severity tradeoff. Clearly, outside this range there may
exist sufficiently small differences in certainty and sufficiently large differences in se-
verity to reverse the relative order of their effectiveness for deterrence. This consideration
is often ignored in the literature. Cf. Chiricos & Waldo, Punishment and Crime: An
Examination of Some Empirical Evidence, 18 Soc. PRoB. 200, 200-10 (1970) (in data analysis
not taking certainty and severity into account simultaneously, correlation of certainty
with criminality varies over time and among offenses and there is no consistent support
for deterrent effect of severity); Tittle, Crime Rates and Legal Sanctions, 16 Soc. PROI.
409, 409, 419, 422-23 (1969) (severity of punishment "has little consistent independent or
additive effect," although total effect of certainty and severity is complex).
For example, with the imposition of the minimum penalty, those cases in which the
minimum, or more than the minimum, is assigned will tend to weight the severity
factor upward. But cf. pp. 617-18 supra (discussing conditions under which bargain
outcome is more severe, even though trial outcome would not be at minimum penalty
or above). Each case, however, in which a zero penalty is assigned-whether through
judge or jury acquittal, judge dismissal, or prosecutor decision to drop charges-pushes
the likelihood factor downward.
It is also possible for there to be an appearance of nullification independent of its
occurrence, with the perceived low probability of sanction having an effect on behavior
similar to that of actual nullification. See Tittle & Rowe, Certainty of Arrest and Crime
Rates: A Further Test of the Deterrence Hypothesis, 52 Soc. FORCES 455, 457-61 (1974)
(deterrence effect exists when enforcement exceeds 30% arrest clearance rate, but if
enforcement is below this "tipping point," differences in enforcement have only negligible
deterrent effect).
89. This has been contended in particular for the imposition of a mandatory death
penalty. See Riedel, supra note 6, at 265, 282-83 (empirical study of death penalty); pp. 615-
16 & note 54 supra. The use of the term "certainty" in the deterrence literature, where
it connotes likelihood, such as that of arrest, prosecution, or sanction, is different from
the use of the term elsewhere in economics, particularly in portfolio theory.
90. See Chambers, Men Who Know They Are Watched: Some Benefits and Costs of
Jailing for Nonpayment of Support, 75 MicH. L. Rav. 900, 912-13, 936-37 (1977) (deter-
rence strongest in counties in which likelihood of prosecution and of jailing lead poten-
tial offenders to perceive clear link between their own behavior and system that leads
to punishment); note 88 supra (discussing relative deterrent effect of certainty and se-
verity of sanction). See also Bailey & Smith, Punishment: Its Severity and Certainly, 63
J. C~ist. L.C. & P.S. 530, 536-38 (finding inverse relationship between severity and cer-
tainty of sanction); Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability
and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Amr. ECON. REv. 880 (1979) (investigating optimal level of
fines and likelihood of sanction taking into account cost of enforcement).
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may increase, rather than decrease, the level of occurrence of the
proscribed activity.
B. Policy Implications
It is when the minimum penalty is high or when the enforcement
agency's initial strength or allocable resources are relatively low that
the policy has its "bite," altering the outcome otherwise reached by
trial or negotiation. 91 Paradoxically, these are also the circumstances
under which the possibility of policy frustration looms greatest. The
most successful policies will be those that minimize the disparity be-
tween the legally correct outcome and the outcome consistent with
the decisionmaker's sense of fairness. Yet, if the purpose of the policy
is to change substantially the results of judicial decisionmaking, then
the policies having the greatest chance of success-those closest to what
judicial decisionmakers would choose anyway-are the ones that least
fulfill policy intent even when successful.
Under a policy of mandatory minimum penalties, some defendants
who would otherwise receive lower penalties obviously suffer losses
because of the new policy. If such defendants are the targets of the
policy,92 this result represents fulfillment of policy objectives. Yet
other defendants who would be convicted under a regime of flexible
sentencing may go free as a result of nullification by judges or other
decisionmakers. The resulting penalty reductions, as well as the ag-
gregate effect of a drop in deterrence due to decreased certainty of
sanction, constitute losses from the policy that are borne by the public.
The pattern of policy fulfillment versus nullification depends not
only on the level of the penalty, but also on the level of the financial
commitment to enforcement agencies. If the prosecuting agency's bud-
get is greater, nullification plays a less prominent role; 93 in that event,
some case outcomes are higher not only because of the new penalty
requirement, but also because increased prosecutorial effort results
in an anticipated outcome high enough so that the minimum penalty
level is surpassed. Similarly, a financial commitment to the institu-
tions providing the initial information may place the prosecutor in a
position strong enough so that the minimum penalty need not be
relied upon for obtaining favorable results.9 4 Taking the resource
91. See pp. 620-22 supra. For discussion of criteria of policy success, see note 2 supra.
92. The policy is successful in the sense used here if the affected group is neither
underinclusive nor overinclusive as compared with the target group.
93. See p. 622 supra.
94. See pp. 620-24 supra. This Note does not address the question of the proper
distribution of resources among various enforcement and legal process institutions; such
resources should, however, be distributed in such a way that the marginal benefit of the
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commitment into account, the policy decision involves the weighing
of the goal of increased penalties in some cases against the prospect
of nullification in others.
In addition, there are other factors to be considered, including
the incidence of policy effect across individuals due to small differ-
ences in evidence or differences in legally irrelevant information.
Under some circumstances, the policy results in like treatment of
individuals who, under a regime of no restrictions, would be treated
in a disparate fashion.95 Under other circumstances the presence of
the penalty serves to magnify the disparity of treatment accorded
those who differ only in irrelevant ways or whose cases exhibit only
a small difference in evidence 6 This pattern of effect may or may
not be socially desirable, but in either event it can lend substantial
weight to one side of the balance and thus be critical to the policy
choices made.
Finally, there are considerations not taken into account in the
model presented here that should nevertheless be relevant to a final
policy decision. Among these are judgments about the importance to
the community of making a strong symbolic statement about com-
munity values-for example, by the adoption of a death penalty-
despite possible nullification in practice. By using the law to express
community preferences in the abstract while permitting judges and
juries to exercise individualized judgment on a case-by-case basis, the
community is able simultaneously to accommodate a commitment
to uniformity of treatment and to satisfy a desire for fairness to
individuals."
last dollar allocated is equalized for all institutions subject to the allocation decision.
See Thurow, Equity Versus Efficiency in Law Enforcement, 18 PuB. PoLIcY 451 (1970)
(discussing distribution of resources by marginal benefit rule, where definition of "benefit"
varies as a function of equity goals).
95. See pp. 620-22 & notes 61-66 supra.
96. Id.
97. One approach to the problem is to adopt legislatively specified adjustments for
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE ON CRIM-
INAL SENTENCING, supra note 25, at 19-34 (proposals); A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 70, at
79-106, 124-31 (report of Committee for the Study of Incarceration). The latter proposals,
allowing for the adjustment of mandated sentences if aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances are shown, capture some but not much of the flexibility needed to obviate the
undesirable effects of mandated penalties discussed in this Note. Cf. Underwood, Law
and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized
Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1426 nA9 (1979) (noting conflict between "fundamental
value of decisionmaking in accordance with general standards and the equally funda-
mental value of individualized decisionmaking"). The adoption of uniform penalties is
generally considered to be a step in favor of the general standards approach, but, as
demonstrated in this Note, the effects may be to increase disparity in the treatment of
individuals.
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In the end, the choice is not simply one of whether or not to adopt
a penalty requirement, but a choice about a broader and more com-
plex set of policy options, and, in effect, a choice among policy con-
sequences. For a specified level and form of sanction, the extent of
policy fulfillment, nullification, and other effects can be estimated,
given sufficient research before adoption of such policies. In light of
these anticipated consequences, decisions that are essentially political
must still be made. Since the prospect of nullification looms most
prominently at those levels of penalty for which the policy signifi-
cantly changes judicial outcome, the extent of policy fulfillment and
its associated benefits must be weighed against the losses associated
with nullification and other policy consequences.
Ultimately, these choices are made not in the abstract, but in the
context of specific legislative goals and values. This Note suggests
that those policies will be most successful-both in terms of trial and
bargained outcomes, and in terms of the influence on decision pro-
cesses in the courts-that take into account the anticipated responses
of judicial decisionmakers, and the institutional tradeoffs that their
decisions precipitate.
